Belmond British Pullman
The Cornish Weekend
These are the times from the Realtime Trains website covering its movements. It could be a very interesting weekend.
Friday 22nd April. London Victoria 09.48 Exeter St David's 15.01/15.06 Plymouth 16.31/16.42 Par 17.32/17.40 Truro 18.03/18.36 Truro Yard 18.48 Loco goes to St Blazey at 19.15 arriving St Blazey 20.03
Saturday 23rd April. St Blazey 07.15 Truro Yard 08.05/09.00 Penzance 09.40/10.20 Truro 10.55/11.00 St Austell 11.20/11.25 Plymouth 12.20/12.31 Liskeard 12.56 Par 13.17 Truro 13.37 Camborne 13.53 Penzance 14.10/14.25 Truro 14.59/15.04 St Austell 15.26/15.35 Par 15.41/15.43 Liskeard 16.04 Plymouth 16.35/17.00 Tavistock Jct 17.16/18.04 Plymouth 18.18/18.40 Exeter 19.53 Taunton 20.26/20.55 Plymouth 23.04 to Tavistock Jct
Sunday 24th April. Tavistock Jct 08.36 Plymouth 08.50/09.05 Liskeard 09.28 Par 09.48 Truro 10.09 Penzance 10.39 to slopers. Penzance dep 11.33 Truro 12.05. Depart Truro 12.20 St Austell 12.40/12.45 Plymouth 13.39/13.48 Exeter 14.52 London Victoria 20.45
The Cornish Weekend
These are the times from the Realtime Trains website covering its movements. It could be a very interesting weekend.
Friday 22nd April. London Victoria 09.48 Exeter St David's 15.01/15.06 Plymouth 16.31/16.42 Par 17.32/17.40 Truro 18.03/18.36 Truro Yard 18.48 Loco goes to St Blazey at 19.15 arriving St Blazey 20.03
Saturday 23rd April. St Blazey 07.15 Truro Yard 08.05/09.00 Penzance 09.40/10.20 Truro 10.55/11.00 St Austell 11.20/11.25 Plymouth 12.20/12.31 Liskeard 12.56 Par 13.17 Truro 13.37 Camborne 13.53 Penzance 14.10/14.25 Truro 14.59/15.04 St Austell 15.26/15.35 Par 15.41/15.43 Liskeard 16.04 Plymouth 16.35/17.00 Tavistock Jct 17.16/18.04 Plymouth 18.18/18.40 Exeter 19.53 Taunton 20.26/20.55 Plymouth 23.04 to Tavistock Jct
Sunday 24th April. Tavistock Jct 08.36 Plymouth 08.50/09.05 Liskeard 09.28 Par 09.48 Truro 10.09 Penzance 10.39 to slopers. Penzance dep 11.33 Truro 12.05. Depart Truro 12.20 St Austell 12.40/12.45 Plymouth 13.39/13.48 Exeter 14.52 London Victoria 20.45
THE PLYMOUTH ACCIDENT - AN INTERIM REPORT RELEASED
Subject: RAIL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH MEDIA RELEASE - MONDAY 18 APRIL 2016
Collision at Plymouth station
From:
Rail Accident Investigation Branch
First published:
18 April 2016
Investigation into a collision between a moving and a stationary train, Plymouth, 3 April 2016
Collision at Plymouth station
From:
Rail Accident Investigation Branch
First published:
18 April 2016
Investigation into a collision between a moving and a stationary train, Plymouth, 3 April 2016
Image showing trains after the accident: 2E68 on the left (courtesy BTP)
At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 35 people, including the driver of one of the trains were injured, some seriously.
The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not, because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had one member of staff on board.
Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 60 passengers on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working, and is allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.
Approaching Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 14 mph (22 km/h) approaching signal P15 on the approach to Plymouth station. This signal cleared from red (meaning stop) to an indication meaning that the train may proceed into platform 6, but that the driver must be prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. Signal P15 is located around 333 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood.
The train then accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h) and as train 2E68 approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train’s fixtures and onto the floor.
Our investigation will include examination of:
We will publish our findings, including any safety recommendations at the conclusion of our investigation; these will be available on our website.
At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 35 people, including the driver of one of the trains were injured, some seriously.
The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not, because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had one member of staff on board.
Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 60 passengers on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working, and is allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.
Approaching Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 14 mph (22 km/h) approaching signal P15 on the approach to Plymouth station. This signal cleared from red (meaning stop) to an indication meaning that the train may proceed into platform 6, but that the driver must be prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. Signal P15 is located around 333 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood.
The train then accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h) and as train 2E68 approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train’s fixtures and onto the floor.
Our investigation will include examination of:
- the actions of staff involved
- the signalling and platform working arrangements at Plymouth station
- the performance of the train during the collision
- any underlying management factors.
We will publish our findings, including any safety recommendations at the conclusion of our investigation; these will be available on our website.
Many thanks to Derek Buttivant for advising us of this press release, a final report will be issued in due course.